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via Kidney International. Th ere is indeed an 
international concern that the poor of sev-
eral countries are selling kidneys to affl  uent 
individuals who have the resources to make 
that purchase. Th ese sales are inherently 
coercive. What evidence do the authors 
have that enables the conclusion that the 
“sale of purchased donor kidneys [that] 
now accounts for thousands of black mar-
ket transplants” is “voluntary”?
The World Health Organization has 
recently conducted regional meetings in 
Manila and Karachi to obtain the insights 
of health officials about the transplant 
tourism that is occurring. Regional offi  -
cials agree that the black markets must 
be eliminated by a concerted eff ort of the 
United Nations, just as the black markets 
for the sale of women and children must 
be addressed.
Th e Friedmans seem out of touch when 
they suggest that “the number of deceased 
donor kidney transplants performed in the 
United States has been relatively static over 
the past decade.” As a result of the Organ 
Donation Collaborative, the United States 
is in the midst of unprecedented increases 
in the number of deceased organ donors.
Finally, the Friedmans pose this ques-
tion, seemingly the ultimate one for them: 
“What then is to be done to ease the short-
age of kidney donors?” Well, the authors 
might be just as fervent in recommend-
ing national policy that brings preventive 
medicine to improve public health. Obes-
ity, hypertension, adult-onset diabetes, and 
atherosclerotic disease are major compo-
nents of the increasing necessity for kidney 
transplants. Preventive medicine is omitted 
from the table of the authors’ solutions.
The “system failure” that the authors 
decry is not only at the doorstep of organ 
donation when the expansion of the wait-
ing list for kidney transplants is heav-
ily composed of the elderly whose poor 
medical care has resulted in end-stage 
renal disease.
Th e frequency with which patients die 
with a functioning graft  in the imme-
diate post-transplantation period may 
be refl ective of  the medical unsuitabil-
ity of some patients to undergo renal 
transplantation.6 If so, then perhaps the 
authors would consider that the true sys-
tem failure may be the expectation that 
the central solution resides in a limitless 
number of human organs. Unless and 
until an organ supply is derived from 
genetically manipulated pigs, some 
patients may die when the omission of 
preventive medical care has resulted in 
end-stage organ failure.
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Rewards for organ donation: the 
time has come
AP Monaco1
Strategies to expand the pool of solid organs for transplantation have 
had only limited success. Waiting times exceeding 5 years and/or 
waiting mortality are not uncommon. A system of financial rewards 
for living and deceased organ donation is proposed. The reward 
program would be  administered by the federal government. Donors 
or beneficiaries would receive a fixed financial reward, similar to the 
payout of an insurance policy, from a federal agency.  Such a system 
would be consistent with similar financial rewards given in our society to 
recognize instances of personal self-sacrifice and risk taking performed 
for the benefit of others.
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In their article “Payment for donor kid-
neys: Pros and cons,”1 in this issue (p 960), 
the very distinguished transplantation 
experts Eli and Amy Friedman present 
a thoughtful, well-organized, balanced 
analysis of the reasons to consider estab-
lishment of a “federal agency to manage 
the marketing and purchase of donor kid-
neys in collaboration with the United Net-
work for Organ Sharing.” I agree with the 
concepts and direction of their arguments 
to consider some type of compensation or 
fi nancial reward for organ donation. I do 
diff er in the details of how such a policy 
should be implemented. Also, I do not 
think that the function of such an agency 
should be described as the management 
of the marketing and purchase of donor 
kidneys — but more about that later.
Th e facts as presented are irrefutable: 
the number of people sustaining end-
stage renal failure annually continues to 
grow, the number of available kidneys 
(from living and deceased donors) that are 
successfully transplanted remains below 
the number required to keep up with this 
growth, and the time on the waiting list 
continues to increase (more than 5 years 
in many regions). A substantial number 
of people (7%) waiting on the list die each 
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year without transplantation. All of our 
imaginative and well-intentioned eff orts 
to increase the donor pool have had only 
a minimal impact on the number of donor 
kidneys available for transplantation. 
Use of so-called ‘marginal’ or ‘expanded 
donor’ kidneys has increased the avail-
able donor pool, but only modestly, and 
it could be argued that many of these 
kidneys fail earlier than living-donor or 
standard deceased-donor kidneys, thereby 
increasing the number of people return-
ing to the wait list and reducing the long-
term overall benefi cial eff ect. Similarly, 
the superior results achieved with living 
kidney donors, even with non-related, 
non-consanguineous donors, have been 
an unexpected impetus to use less-than-
ideal living donors. Use of donors with 
two-drug-controlled hypertension is not 
unusual, let alone single-drug-control-
led hypertension. My impression is that 
we have lowered the bar in a dangerous 
way in the selection of kidney donors, 
both deceased and living — a possibil-
ity that has drawn increasing attention 
in the lay press.2 Furthermore, a number 
of thoughtful, well-intentioned strate-
gies — exchanges (swaps) between one 
or more ABO-incompatible living-donor 
recipient–donor pairs or cross-match-
incompatible pairs (or even combina-
tions thereof) — have been implemented.3 
Th ese maneuvers add a few additional 
transplants to all programs, but their over-
all eff ect in expanding the donor pool, in 
my experience, is negligible. Advances in 
basic science research that would facilitate 
generation and growth of human solid 
organs (kidneys) in vitro and/or permit 
transplantation of xenogeneic organs are 
no doubt years away. We need a bold, new 
approach to increase the available kidney 
donor pool.
The extraordinary effectiveness of 
kidney transplantation, especially liv-
ing-donor kidney transplantation, to 
essentially cure, for a very long time, end-
stage renal disease has brought into prime 
focus the urgent need to consider possi-
ble alternatives in the form of rewards 
and/or fi nancial compensation to expand 
the donor pool. Finally, this concept is 
beginning to get the attention it merits. 
Eli and Amy Friedman present a concise 
and eff ective analysis of the arguments for 
and against a formal federally regulated 
system to encourage living-donor kidney 
donation by financial compensation.1 
Th ey explain that fi nancial compensation 
for organ donation (as opposed to reim-
bursement for expenses incurred or loss 
of income) has been strictly prohibited in 
the United States by the National Organ 
Transplant Act, which makes the acqui-
sition of any human organ for valuable 
consideration (money) for use in human 
transplantation punishable by fi nes and 
imprisonment. Th is legislation was well 
intentioned and basically was designed 
to protect the poor and disenfranchised 
from potentially dangerous and unhealthy 
exploitation by unscrupulous middlemen 
and avaricious brokers. Such legislation 
has been quite effective in the United 
States, but an extensive black market in 
living-donor kidneys — many of marginal 
quality and transplanted under less than 
optimal conditions, frequently by sur-
geons of limited quality and experience 
— has fl ourished in a number of coun-
tries around the world.4 Th e number of 
American patients who use these organ 
black markets has grown; the presence of 
such patients seeking post-transplantation 
care is now commonplace in most Ameri-
can programs.
Government prohibition of the unregu-
lated sale of kidneys to protect the poor 
from exploitation is appropriate and cer-
tainly justified. Similarly, government 
infl uence on, and management and reg-
ulation of, the way organs are obtained, 
processed, and distributed to ensure 
organ quality, safety, and fair access is 
also a proper, desirable, and critical role 
for government. On the other hand, the 
idea that any type of gain, reward, or 
compensation — fi nancial or otherwise 
— for organ donation is unethical and 
inherently undesirable does not neces-
sarily follow. Rewards for doing good, 
for making self-sacrifi ces, for taking per-
sonal risks to help others in one’s family, 
community, or country are evident in 
every fabric of modern Western society. 
Numerous examples can be given, but 
perhaps the most obvious in the United 
States is voluntary military service. Th e 
overwhelming majority of volunteers for 
the United States Military are motivated 
by idealism and patriotism, but they are 
also encouraged to volunteer with induce-
ments of paid college educations, enlist-
ment bonuses, reenlistment bonuses, and 
substantial fi nancial recovery for injury or 
mortality.5 It is not surprising that minor-
ity-group members with limited fi nancial 
resources are numerically disproportion-
ately represented in the military. Likewise, 
signifi cant numbers of noncitizen immi-
grants volunteer for military service and 
are eventually rewarded for their service 
by American citizenship (a route taken 
by my own father in World War I). Th us, 
the concept of encouraging and reward-
ing acts of self-sacrifi ce and personal risk 
taking to help others — acts essentially 
motivated by love, altruism, idealism, 
patriotism, or the like — with valu-
able considerations (including money) is 
unequivocally established and considered 
ethically acceptable, even with the realiza-
tion that more poorer people will under-
take self-sacrifi ce and personal risk in part 
to gain the fi nancial rewards.
Another interesting aspect of the debate 
on fi nancial rewards for kidney donation 
has been raised by the rapid acceptance of 
totally altruistic kidney donors6, so-called 
Good Samaritan donors. Th ese are people 
who present themselves as kidney donors 
to anyone on a transplant program’s wait-
ing list. Th eir motivation is total, unadul-
terated altruism. Th ey have not met and 
have no emotional or social connection 
to the recipient prior to the transplant. 
Whereas use of such donors was ini-
tially considered inappropriate, they are 
now accepted in a majority of American 
programs. My own experience with such 
donors7 is that they are the most selfl ess, 
committed, sacrifi cing people. A signifi -
cant number of these individuals are of 
limited fi nancial means. Th ey certainly 
do not seek fi nancial gain in their dona-
tion. Nevertheless, if a fi nancial reward for 
kidney donation existed, would it be inap-
propriate to provide it to them? Would it 
make them less altruistic? Would their gift  
and sacrifi ce be less meaningful and meri-
torious? I think not.
I think the biggest problem in initiating 
a system of fi nancial rewards for kidney 
donation is the fact that both opponents 
and proponents (see Friedman and Fried-
man1 in this issue) refer to the activity 
exclusively as buying and selling organs. 
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Buying and selling implies fi nancial nego-
tiation between recipient (buyer) and 
donor (seller), suggests higher or lower 
prices in the face of variations in value 
and quality, may involve brokers and mid-
dlemen, and so on. Certainly this is not 
desirable. We need a government-regu-
lated, scrupulously supervised program in 
which a person or his or her estate receives 
a fi xed valuable enhancement or reward 
for organ donation. No less a personage 
than Paul Terasaki suggested that donors 
be rewarded with a valuable gold medal — 
the implication being that it could be kept 
or sold according to the donor’s wishes.8 
I envision a scheme in which a govern-
ment insurance trust fund is established 
and administered by a federal agency or 
commission. A fixed-amount specific 
reward or honorarium for organ donation 
would be provided to living organ donors 
or to benefi ciaries of estates of deceased 
donors. Th e reward would be disbursed by 
the federal agency in essentially the same 
manner as the payment of an insurance 
policy. Payment would be implemented 
aft er notifi cation and certifi cation of the 
donation by accredited transplant pro-
grams, and confi rmation of the donation 
by the United Network for Organ Sharing 
or government health agencies. Again it 
must be emphasized that this would not 
be the buying or selling of organs; it would 
be a specific, fixed-amount reward for 
organ donation. Interestingly, a reward 
of $40,000 to $80,000 has been suggested 
as financially feasible,9,10 with enough 
savings possibly generated by reduced 
dialysis costs to make the system self-
sustaining. Obviously, this very limited 
description of this concept is an extreme 
simplifi cation of what would be a complex 
system necessary to assure accurate and 
honest implementation of rewards that 
should encourage both living-donor and 
deceased-donor organ donation.
One fi nal note: Th ere is concern in both 
major American political parties that any 
government effort to pay rewards for 
organ donation could be interpreted as 
advocating a policy that is directly exploit-
ive of the poor. Th ere is obvious reluctance 
to take a strong leadership role in this 
eff ort on the part of both parties. Th e gov-
ernment should establish a nonpartisan 
federal commission to study all aspects of 
the organ shortage and recommend ways 
to remedy it, with particular emphasis on 
a system to provide fi nancial and/or other 
types of valuable rewards for organ dona-
tion. Establishment of such a nonpartisan 
commission would be a critically impor-
tant initial step in seeking a solution to 
this vexing problem of shortage of solid 
organs for transplantation.
REFERENCES
1. Friedman E, Friedman A. Payment for donor 
kidneys: Pros and cons. Kidney Int 2006; 69: 960–
962.
2. Reynolds G. Will any organ do? NY Times Mag 10 July 
2005.
3. Wessel D. Easing the kidney shortage. Wall Str J 17 
June 2004.
4. Tilney NL. Transplant: From Myth to Reality. Yale 
University Press: New Haven and London, 2003, pp 
263–274.
5. Brooke J. On the farthest US shores, Iraq is a way to 
a dream: enlistment is a prize in Pacific territories. N 
YTimes 31 July 2005.
6. Crowley-Matoka M, Switzer G. Non-directed living 
donation. A survey of current trends and practices. 
Transplantation 2005; 79: 515–519.
7. Morrissey PE, Dube C, Gohh R et al. Good samaritan 
kidney donation. Transplantation 2005; 80: 1369–
1373.
8. Terasaki P. A Congressional gold medal for 
transplant donors and families. Am J Transplant 
2005; 5: 1167.
9. Becker GS, Elias JJ. Introducing incentives in the 
market for live and cadaveric organ donations. 
Conference on Organ Transplantation: Economic, 
Ethical, and Policy Issues; 16 May 2003; Chicago, 
Illinois, USA.
10. Matas AJ, Schnitzler M. Payment for living donor 
(vendor) kidneys: a cost-effectiveness analysis. Am J 
Transplant 2004; 4: 216–221.
see mini review on page 960 
Voluntary reciprocal altruism: 
a novel strategy to encourage 
deceased organ donation
DW Landry1
New strategies are needed to encourage organ donation. Altruism, the 
impulse that underlies our present system, is undermined by proposals 
that provide tangible inducements to improve donation which are, 
in their own subtle ways, coercive. I propose a new strategy based on 
implementing an option to donate that reinforces the strong reciprocity 
which drives anonymous altruism.
Kidney International (2006) 69, 957–959. doi:10.1038/sj.ki.5000280
Th e Friedmans’ proposal1 (this issue) to 
pay for deceased organs underscores the 
failure of the current system to provide 
adequate numbers of donations.
Delmonico’s critique2 (this issue) con-
cludes with an argument for public health 
initiatives to reduce the demand for dona-
tions, but he too seeks new strategies to 
increase supply and favors incentives as 
long as they are ethical.3 Th e ethics and 
eff ectiveness of incentives to next of kin, 
such as priority points should any need a 
transplant, are subject to debate. Th e most 
benign of the ethical incentives — a gold 
medal commemorating the donation — is 
unobjectionable, but this inducement is 
also unlikely to be compelling for many. 
Another approach would increase the 
donor pool by presuming consent unless 
it is actively revoked by the prospec-
tive donor, but this is vastly unpopular, 
because it is seen as coercive and failing 
to respect the individual.4
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